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Abstract—We present a machine-checked security analysis of
Belenios – a deployed voting protocol used already in more
than 200 elections. Belenios extends Helios with an explicit
registration authority to obtain eligibility guarantees.
We offer two main results. First, we build upon a recent
framework for proving ballot privacy in EasyCrypt. Inspired
by our application to Belenios, we adapt and extend the privacy
security notions to account for protocols that include a regis-
tration phase. Our analysis identifies a trust assumption which
is missing in the existing (pen and paper) analysis of Belenios:
ballot privacy does not hold if the registrar misbehaves, even
if the role of the registrar is seemingly to provide eligibility
guarantees. Second, we develop a novel framework for proving
strong verifiability in EasyCrypt and apply it to Belenios. In
the process, we clarify several aspects of the pen-and-paper
proof, such as how to deal with revote policies.
Together, our results yield the first machine-checked anal-
ysis of both ballot privacy and verifiability properties for a
deployed electronic voting protocol. Perhaps more importantly,
we identify several issues regarding the applicability of existing
definitions of privacy and verifiability to systems other than
Helios. While we show how to adapt the definitions to the
particular case of Belenios, our findings indicate the need for
more general security notions for electronic voting protocols
with registration authorities.
1. Introduction
The need for secure electronic voting is indisputable.
While some countries (like Germany, the UK or Norway)
have decided to stop or even ban electronic voting due to
the fear of security failures, induced by several attacks [32],
[33], others are at least trialing, or even running legally
binding elections using such electronic voting systems (used
in Australia, Estonia, Switzerland or Uruguay, for example).
Regardless of its use in major political elections, electronic
voting is often employed in other types of elections, whose
lower stakes does not make them less important, or less
prone to subversion attempts, such as the election of union
representatives or administration councils. To be useful in
such settings, voting systems need to satisfy two key security
properties: i. ballot privacy (no one knows how I voted), and
ii. verifiability (I can check that the result includes my vote,
and anyone can check that the result corresponds to the
published evidence), both of which may sometimes come
in stronger flavours (such as receipt-freeness, coercion-
resistance, everlasting privacy, or accountability).
As is the case for general security protocols, the tasks of
formalizing security notions for electronic voting, designing
voting protocols that meet these notions, and formally prov-
ing that this is the case are all complex, error-prone tasks.
In particular, formal definitions for privacy and verifiability
are continously evolving [13], [21] and attacks against well-
studied protocols still arise (for example, clash attacks in
ThreeBallots [29] or replay attack on Helios [23]). The
recent development of formal techniques and tools to reason
about the correctness of cryptographic proofs, and their par-
tial application to electronic voting, makes these protocols
and their proofs interesting targets for formalization.
Our main contribution is a full, machine-checked se-
curity analysis of the Belenios voting protocol [1], cov-
ering both privacy and verifiability considerations. The
choice of Belenios–a protocol that is deployed on a vot-
ing platform [1], and has already been used in more than
200 elections which include the election of representatives
in research labs and universities–serves as evidence that
machine-checked proofs can contribute to building high-
assurance electronic voting systems that are applicable in
practice, with increased understanding and adoption as a
potential side-effect of reinforcing trust. Our analysis uses
EasyCrypt1 [6], an interactive theorem prover with support
for writing cryptographic security proofs in the compu-
tational model of cryptography. It has been successfully
applied to various protocols, including multi-party compu-
tation [3] and authenticated key-exchange protocols [5]. We
build upon an existing formalisation of the Helios protocol
and its privacy properties in EasyCrypt [18], and demon-
strate some form of proof reuse, despite differences in the
scheme and privacy definitions. We now detail our results.
PRIVACY. Our analysis of the privacy properties of Bele-
nios builds on an existing proof methodology suggested by
Bernhard et al [13]. This approach identifies three distinct
security notions that have some bearing on the privacy of
1. https://www.easycrypt.info
individual votes. These properties, namely BPRIV (ballot
privacy of the voting phase), strong correctness (a honestly
generated ballot will always be accepted), and strong con-
sistency (the tally behaves as counting the votes extracted
from ballots) have been shown to entail simulation-based
privacy [13].
These notions form the basis of a formal framework
developed in EasyCrypt by Cortier et al [18] to analyze
hundreds of variants of the Helios voting system. Although
Belenios is an extension of Helios, the existing framework
is not sufficient since it does not account for the type of
registration authority which Belenios employs. Interestingly,
straightforward extensions of the existing privacy notions
result in definitions that are not satisfied by Belenios.
The first step in this formal analysis was therefore to ex-
tend the existing privacy definitions in a way that reflects the
intuition behind the original notions and covers the setting
specific to Belenios. In this, we follow the definitions pro-
posed by Cortier et al. [20] in their pen-and-paper analysis
of Belenios, but unveil a trust assumption that was missing.
Interestingly, privacy holds only when the registrar is honest:
a dishonest registrar may selectively prevent some honest
ballots from being counted which results in a privacy breach,
since only the votes from the targeted voters would remain.
This trust assumption can be seen as the analogue of a trust
assumption on the ballot box. Bernhard and Smyth [16] note
that existing game-based definitions of privacy implicitly
assume an honest ballot box: just like a corrupt registrar,
a corrupt ballot box may selectively remove some honest
ballots and break privacy. This assumption on the registrar is
missing from the analysis of Cortier et al [20] only because
they focus on ballot privacy–for which it is not necessary–
whereas we also consider the related properties of strong
correctness and strong consistency. As such, their analysis
is not flawed, but simply incomplete.
On the matter of privacy, in addition to a machine-
checked proof for Belenios, we therefore also contribute a
formalization of extended definitions that include a registra-
tion phase and identify permissive trust assumptions under
which Belenios can be proved secure.
VERIFIABILITY. As far as we are aware, our work is the
first to produce a machine-checked proof of verifiability
properties of a voting system in the computational model.
Specifically, from the various proposed definition of
verifiability (see [21] for a survey), we select one due to
Cortier et al [20]. The notion enjoys two nice features: it
simultaneously captures individual, universal, and eligibility
verifiability and additionally accounts for the fact that voters
may not perform the verifiability checks. Intuitively, a voting
system is strongly verifiable [20] if the result of the election
reflects:
• all the votes of the honest voters who checked;
• some of the votes of the honest voters who did not
check (an attacker may typically always drop such
votes); and
• if k dishonest voters were involved in the election, then
at most k additional votes.
We develop Easycrypt formalizations of strong verifiability
and apply the resulting framework to Belenios. Our analysis
yields several clarifications of the original pen-and-paper
definitions of [20], for example including consideration of
(simple) revoting policies and clearer definitions of circum-
stances in which a voter is deemed to have checked her
vote. Moreover, we strengthen the definitions by letting
the adversary have the election’s secret key which models
that the trusted parties may misbehave. We further extend
our formal development to cover not only the deployed
version of Belenios but also several of its election variants
(changing, for example, the kind and amount of data is
published by the tallying authorities).
Taken together, our results yield the first machine
checked analysis of both privacy and verifiability proper-
ties for a deployed electronic voting protocol. Our formal
definitions, statements and proof scripts are available pub-
licly [19], along with instructions on how to verify them.
RELATED WORK. We already discussed in details the work
of [18]. To our knowledge, it is the only machine-checked
of a voting scheme in cryptographic models, under standard
assumptions. It does not cover verifiability and cannot be
applied directly to Belenios. Automatic proofs of privacy
in the symbolic model have been proposed for several
protocols of the literature such as FOO [25], Helios [23],
or the Norwegian e-voting protocol [24]. In addition to
analysing these protocols in models of cryptography that
are considerably more abstract than the usual computational
models, the use of automated protocol verification tools
like ProVerif [17] requires further simplifications of both
the cryptographic primitives and the protocol (e.g. a limited
number of ballots can be received, in a given order).
A pen and paper proof of a preliminary version of
Belenios appears in [20]. However, this work is not a direct
implementation of this proof. First, our formal model of
verifiability led to further clarifications of the original defi-
nitions. Second, and more importantly, the privacy proof was
only sketched in [20] and covered only the BPRIV property.
Our privacy analysis also covers the two complementary
properties (strong correctness and strong consistency) and
reveals a missing trust assumption (although not contracting
the theorems of [20]): the registrar needs to be honest in
order to aim for simulation-based security.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we recall the basic cryptographic primi-
tives used by Belenios. We keep details minimal and provide
appropriate references for further details.
Labelled Public-Key Encryption Scheme. Labelled en-
cryption is an extension of the classical definition introduced
by Shoup [31]. Encryption takes, in addition to keys and
plaintexts, a public label. The resulting ciphertext protects
the integrity of the label: decryption of a ciphertext will only
succeed if the appropriate label is provided. The primitive
does not aim to provide any privacy for the label which is
transmited either out of band or together with the ciphertext.
Formally, the labelled public-key encryption schemes is
defined as a triple of algorithms E = (KGen,Enc,Dec)
where:
KGen is a randomized algorithm which on input a security
parameter λ, produces a pair of public and secret keys;
Enc is a randomized algorithm which on input a public
key, a label and a plaintext outputs a ciphertext; We
write C ← Enc(pk, `,m)) for the process of producing
ciphertext C of message m under public key pk and
label `.
Dec is a deterministic algorithm which outputs either a
plaintext or a special error symbol ⊥, given as input
the secret key, a label and a ciphertext.
Correctness requries that with overwhelming probability the
relation
Dec(sk, `,Enc(pk, `,m)) = m,
holds, for any (pk, sk) output by KGen, any label ` and any
message m.
We rely on two security properties for labeled en-
cryption. First we ask for non-malleability under chosen-
plaintext attack [26] and we use the equivalent formalization
suggested by Bellare and Sahai [11] termed indistinguisha-
bility under chosen-ciphertext attack with one parallel de-
cryption query (IND-1-CCA) in [12]. Second, we require
well-spreadness for ciphertexts [28]. Intuitively, the latter
models situation where it is highly unlikely (negligible) to
find a collision on ciphertexts. More formally, E is well-
spread if for any efficient adversary B the probability of the
next experiment:
Pr[c,m, `← B(sk); c′ ← Enc(pk,m, `); return (c = c′)] ,
is negligible in λ, for any (pk, sk)← KGen(1λ).
Most encryption schemes used in electronic voting pro-
tocols are homomorphic. This means, there exists a deter-
ministic algorithm Add such that
Dec(sk,Add(c1, c2)) = Dec(sk, c1) + Dec(sk, c2),
for any secret key sk, and any two ciphertexts c1, c2.
Hash functions: collision resistance and random oracles.
In our analysis we model hash functions in two different
ways. Whenever possible, we only resort to collision re-
sistance of the hash function; in these cases we assume
the hash function is keyed. Formally, any hash function H
satisfies collision resistance, if for any efficient adversary B
the following probability is negligible
Pr[m0,m1 ← B(K) : m0 6= m1 ∧HK(m0) = HK(m1)]
where the probability is over the choice of coins used by
the key-generation algorithm of H , used to generate K.
For most uses however, we model them as random
oracles [9] and rely on the same formalization as used in the
ballot privacy proof for Helios [18]. That is, we replace the
computation of a hash function for a value x with an oracle
call O(x). This oracle maintains a table T that stores pairs
of input and output values. When an algorithm calls O(x)
for some x, O checks if there exists (x, y) in T and returns
y if true; otherwise it generates a value y′ stores (x, y′) in
T and returns y′.
To simplify notation, in many cases, we do not explicitly
show the dependency/access to the random oracle.
Proof System. Belenios uses (zero-knowledge) proof sys-
tems in several places, to ensure that the various operations
have been performed correctly. We briefly go over the for-
malization which we use in our anlaysis. Consider a binary
(NP-relation) R over a pair of elements (x,w), where the
element x is called a statement and w is called witness. A
non-interactive proof system for R consists of a prover P
and a verifier V algorithm which work on a common input
x; the prover computes a proof pi ← P(x,w) with the help
of the witness and sends it to the verifier; the verifier then
decides whether to accept or reject the proof.
A proof system is said to be complete, if for any (x,w) ∈
R, we have that V(x,P(x,w)) = true with overwhelming
probability.
The second property is soundness: a prover cannot con-
vince a verifier that a false statement is true. In this paper
we use the stronger property that asks that the proof system
is a proof of knowledge: if a prover can convince a verifier
that a statement is true, then is possible to extract a witness
for that statement [8].
In this paper we consider an extension where the prover
returns two valid statements (and corresponding proofs) and
the extractor needs to provide witnesses for both. The formal
experiment is in Figure 1. It considers an extractor K which
works against an adversary B: the adversary produces two
statements and accompanying proofs. The adversary wins
if the proofs are valid, yet the extractor cannot extract
witnesses for both statements.
ExppokB,V,R()
1 : (x1, pi1, x2, pi2)← B
2 : w1 ← K(x1, pi1)
3 : w2 ← K(x2, pi2)
4 : e← V(x1, pi1) ∧ V(x2, pi2)
5 : rel←R(x1, w1) ∧R(x2, w2)
6 : return e ∧ ¬rel
Figure 1. Proof of knowledge experiment.
The standard notion considers an adversary who outputs
a single statement/proof pair. However, the non-adaptive
case where the adversary outputs two such pairs is equiva-
lent [14], [15]. Therefore, we abuse the notion and say that
a proof system is a a proof of knowledge system, if there
exists an efficient extractor K that produces witnesses for
any valid-looking proofs and statement, such that for any
efficient adversary B = (B1,B2) the probability to win the
experiment in Figure 1 is negligible.
Pr
[
ExppokB,V,R() = 1
]
.
We emphasize that in the random oracle model the extractor
K has access to the random oracle calls made by B; for
simplicity we do not explicitly show this ability in Figure 1).
Another important security property of proof systems,
mainly used in ensuring privacy of electronic voting, is
zero-knowledge. It ensures that no information is leaked,
beside the validity of the relation. Formally, we compare
the execution of a zero-knowledge adversary B with that of
a simulator S in the following two experiments.
Expzk,0B,P,R(λ)
1 : (x,w, state)← B(n)
2 : pi ← ⊥
3 : if (R(x,w)) then
4 : pi ← P(x,w)
5 : β′ ← B(state, pi)
6 : return β′
Expzk,1B,S,R(λ)
1 : (x,w, state)← B(n)
2 : pi ← ⊥
3 : if (R(x,w)) then
4 : pi ← S(x)
5 : β′ ← B(state, pi)
6 : return β′
Informally, the goal of the simulator is to output valid
proofs (for valid statements) but without having access to
a corresponding witness: if such a simulator exists then the
proof itself contains no information about the witness. We
again emphasize that we are in the random oracle model:
here the simulator is in complete control of the random
oracle. As explained before, we do not show here the
dependency on the oracle.
The advantage of a zero-knowledge adversary B over
the proof system ΣR = (P,V), and simulator S is defined
as:∣∣∣Pr[Expzk,0B,P,R(λ) = 1]− Pr[Expzk,1B,S,R(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
A proof system is zero-knowledge if for any adversary B
there exists a simulator S which makes the advantage defined
above, negligible.
Signature schemes. Formally, a signature scheme is a triple
of algorithms E = (SKGen,Sig,Vf) where:
SKGen is a randomized algorithm which on input a security
parameter λ, produces a pair of verification and signing
credential keys;
Sig is a randomized algorithm which on input a signing key
and a message outputs a string;
Vf is a deterministic algorithm which outputs a boolean
value, given as input the verification key, the message
and string.
For any (upk, usk) output by SKGen, any message m, we
have with overwhelming probability that:
Vf(upk,m,Sig(usk,m)) = true.
The security property for signature schemes used by
the voting protocols considered in this paper rely on strong
existential unforgeability [4]. Intuitively, it states that for an
adversary it should be difficult to create a new valid signa-
ture for some message m even after seeing signatures on
arbitrary messages of his chosing, including on the message
for which it attempts the forgery. Formally, a signing system
Π = (SKGen,Sig,Vf) is strongly existentially unforgeable,
if for any efficient adversary B the probability to win the
experiment in Figure 2 is negligible.
Pr
[
ExpseufB,Π () = 1
]
.
ExpseufB,Π ()
1 : sL← [ ]
2 : (upk, usk)← SKGen()
3 : (m, s)← BOsign(upk)
4 : e← Vf(upk,m, s)
5 : return e ∧ (m, s) /∈ sL
Osign(m)
1 : s← Sig(usk,m)
2 : sL← sL ∪ (m, s)
3 : return s
Figure 2. Strong existential unforgeability experiment.
3. Voting Definitions and Properties
In this section we recall single-pass voting schemes, the
class of schemes that we use as basis for our analysis of
Belenios. We start with their syntax and then detail the
desired privacy and verifiability properties for such schemes.
A single-pass voting system [13] is a tuple of algorithms(
Setup, Register, Vote, Valid, VerifyVote,
Publish, Tally, Verify, Box, Count, Policy
)
.
Setup(1λ): Returns a pair of keys (pk, sk).
Register(id): Creates a pair of signing keys (upk, usk) for
the voter id.
Vote(id, v, pk, usk): Constructs a ballot b for voter id that
contains the encryption of their cast vote v with label
upk, and a signature over this encryption with the
signing key usk. The verification key upk can trivially
be computed from the signing key usk.
Valid(BB, b, pk): Checks the validity of ballot b with re-
spect to the ballot box BB.
Publish(BB): Returns the public view of the ballot box BB
called the public bulletin board.
Tally(BB, sk): Computes the result r of the election and a
proof pi of correct computation from BB.
Box(BB, b): Returns a ballot box BB′. If Valid(BB, b, pk)
holds then BB′ = BB ∪ {b}; otherwise BB′ = BB.
Verify((pk, pbb, r), pi): Checks that pi is a valid proof of
correct computation for result r and public bulletin
board pbb.
VerifyVote(b, pbb): Evaluates if the ballot b was properly
registered with respect to the public bulletin board pbb.
Count(L): Given a list of votes as input, a method of
computing the result of the election is applied.
Policy(L): Applies a filtering policy that decides which vote
is kept for each voter, given a list of voters and votes
as input.
3.1. Privacy
Vote privacy, is the idea that no one can obtain infor-
mation about how individual voters have voted. For our
Expbpriv,βA,V,Sim,I(λ)
1 : BB0,BB1 ← [ ]
2 : cL, uL← empty
3 : (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ)
4 : ∀id. id ∈ I do uL.[id]← Register(id)
5 : L← A1(I)
6 : coL← {id| id ∈ I ∧ id ∈ L}
7 : ∀id. id ∈ coL do cL.[id]← uL.[id]
8 : β′ ← AO2 (pk, cL)
9 : return β′
Oracle Ocast(id, b)
1 : if
(
id ∈ coL ∧ Valid(BBβ , b, pk)
)
then
2 : BB0 ← BB0 + [b]; BB1 ← BB1 + [b]
Oracle Otally() for β = 0
1 : (r,Π)← Tally(BB0, sk)
2 :
3 : return (r,Π)
Oracle Otally() for β = 1
1 : (r,Π)← Tally(BB0, sk)
2 : Π′ ← Sim(pk,Publish(BB1), r)
3 : return (r,Π′)
Oracle Ovote(id, v0, v1)
1 : (upk, usk)← uL[id]
2 : if
(
id ∈ I ∧ id /∈ coL) then
3 : b0 ← Vote(id, v0, pk, usk); b1 ← Vote(id, v1, pk, usk)
4 : if
(
Valid(BBβ , bβ , pk)
)
then
5 : BB0 ← BB0 + [b0]; BB1 ← BB1 + [b1]
Oracle Oboard()
1 : return Publish(BBβ)
Figure 3. In the experiments Expbpriv,βA,V,I , the adversary A = (A1,A2) has access to the set of oracles O = {Ocast,Ovote,Otally, Oboard}. The
adversary is allowed to call the Otally oracle at most once.
analysis, we use the approach of Bernhard et al [13] who
distinguish between three rather distinct aspects which im-
pact the privacy of individual votes: ballot privacy, strong
consistency and strong correctness. Together, the three no-
tions imply security in a simulation based sense. We will say
a voting scheme is private, if it meets all three properties.
Below, we recall the intuition behind these definitions and
explain how we adapt and extend them to the case of
Belenios.
BALLOT PRIVACY PROPERTY. We start with ballot privacy
which guarantees that the ballots themselves (as opposed
to ballots together with other information that is published,
e.g. the result of the election) do not reveal any information
about the votes cast. For our analysis, we extend the notion
to account for registration authority and for the use of
credentials to cast votes. For reasons which we explain a
bit later in the paper, we constrain our analysis only to the
case of static corruption.
The formal definition is in Figure 3. It considers an
adversary that attempts to distinguish between two worlds
characterised by a hidden bit β. In the real world (β = 0)
honest votes are cast as chosen by the users, and the final
tally is performed honestly by the authorities; in particular
the tally may come with additional information (e.g. a
ZK proof that the tally was performed honestly). In the
ideal world (β = 1) ballots submitted by honest parties
contain fake votes. We emphasize that the tally is always
performed on the real board (i.e. the BB0): this captures the
idea that the tally itself may reveal some information and
that ballot privacy does not account for that information.
Nonetheless, since the adversary always sees the “real”
result, in the fake world (i.e. for β = 1), security demands
the existence of an efficient simulator (who only has access
to the visible part of the real board) and needs to produce the
additional information in a way that is not distinguishable
by the adversary. Within this setup, if for some scheme
the ballots leak information about the underlying votes then
clearly no simulator would exist, and the scheme would be
deemed insecure, as desired. For more extensive intuition
and discussion of ballot privacy we refer to the paper where
it has been introduced and discussed and compared with
other definitional attempts [13].
The security experiment starts by initializing various
variables used throughout: the two boards BB0 and BB1,
credentials for the users in the involved (those in I), and
various bookkeeping lists. Next, the adversary decides on
a list of users to corrupt (those in L) and obtains their
credentials (maintained in list cL). The rest of the experiment
models the execution of the protocol in the presence of the
adversary. The capabilities of the adversary are modeled
using the oracles in Figure 3, which we informally describe
below:
Ovote(id, v0, v1) : models voting by honest parties. The
adversary decides on two votes for user id; the oracle
uses the secret credential usk of id to create ballots b0
and b1 for v0 and v1. The oracle then checks if ballot
bβ is valid with respect to board BBβ ; if this is the
case then b0 is added to BB0 and b1 is added to BB1.
Ocast(id, b) : models ballot submission by corrupt users.
If ballot b submitted on behalf of user id is valid with
respect to board BBβ (which is the board which the
adversary can see) then b is added to both BB0 and
BB1.
Oboard(BB) : allows the adversary to access the public part
of the bulletin board.
Otally() : returns to the adversary the result of the tally.
The oracle computes the result on board BB0 and
additional information that depends on β: if β = 0
this is the information that the tally authorities would
normally return. If β = 1 it this information is provided
by the simulator Sim.
Our formalism constrains the ballot privacy adversary to
corrupt users only before the voting process starts. This con-
straint is introduced since natural extensions of the existing
ballot privacy definition to incorporate registration author-
ities are too strong. Indeed, a simple replay of a honest
ballot as a cast ballot for the same voter (after corruption)
shows that most voting protocols would be insecure under
such extensions, although this scenario does not indicate a
real weakness in the system.
In brief, this scenario is as follows. The adversary asks
that some honest, registered user id with public credential
upk and secret credential usk submits a challenge (v0, v1) to
its Ovote oracle. BBβ now contains a single encrypted ballot
(id, bβ). The adversary now corrupts id and recasts bβ on
behalf of the voter, leading to the final bulletin board shown
as lists of ballots at the beginning of Fig. 4. For schemes that
allow revote and where the revote policy is to only consider
the last ballot cast (like Belenios [20] and Helios [2]), the
tally will trivially reveal β. Notice that this sequence of
calls, in practice, does not reveal more information about the
ballot than the information revealed by casting the vote only
once. Somehow by chance, Helios, shown private in [13],
[18], does not face this issue thanks to the weeding policy
(duplicate ballots have to be removed to avoid known - real
- attacks [22], [23]). Since there is no clear way to modify
the ballot privacy definition in a way that does not make
it unreasonably weak, in this paper we settle on proving
security of Belenios under static corruptions and leave an
investigation of alternative definitions as future work.
β = 0
BB0 = [(id, b0), (id, b0)]
(v0, pi)← Tally(BB0)
Adversary sees board BB0,
result v0, and real proof pi
β = 1
BB1 = [(id, b1), (id, b1)]
BB0 = [(id, b0), (id, b1)]
(v1, pi)← Tally(BB0)
Adversary sees board BB1,
result v1, and sim. proof pi′
Figure 4. Replay with dynamic corruption.
Definition 1 (Ballot Privacy). A voting scheme V has
ballot privacy if there exists a simulator Sim such that no
efficient adversary A can distinguish between the games
Expbpriv,0A,V,Sim,I(λ) and Exp
bpriv,1
A,V,Sim,I(λ) defined in Figure 3.
That is, the expression
AdvbprivA,V,Sim,I(λ) =∣∣∣Pr[Expbpriv,0A,V,Sim,I(λ) = 1]− Pr[Expbpriv,1A,V,Sim,I(λ) = 1]∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, for any set of voters I .
STRONG CONSISTENCY. The second notion proposed by
Bernhard et al [13] is strong consistency. Informally, this no-
tion demands that for any (adversarially produced) bulletin
board for which each individual ballot is valid, the result
provided by the Tally algorithm is the “correct” one. That
is, the result is the same as the one obtained by decrypting
each individual vote, filtering them using the a filtering
policy Policy that is in place and applying the desired result
function Count.
The original definition associated voter identities to bal-
lots; in this paper we refine the notion and use their public
credentials instead.
Definition 2 (Strong Consistency [13]). Informally, a voting
scheme is strongly consistent if an adversary cannot con-
struct a bulletin board containing only valid ballots in such
a way that applying the tally algorithm to the board yields
a different result than induced by the votes underlying the
ballots. To formalize this notion we demand that there exist:
• An extraction algorithm Extract(b, sk) that provides
the upk with the value computed by decrypting of the
ciphertext contained in the ballot b with the secret sk; and
• A ballot validation algorithm ValidInd(b, pk) that re-
turns true iff the ballot b is “well-formed” with respect to
some notion of well-formedness determined in advance by
the election.
These algorithms must satisfy the following conditions:
1) For any (pk, sk) obtained from Setup(λ), and any
(id, v, usk) with upk trivially computed from usk, if b ←
Vote(id, v, pk, usk) then Extract(b, sk) returns (upk, v) with
overwhelming probability.
2) For any adversarially produced (BB, b), if
Valid(BB, b, pk) returns true, then ValidInd(b, pk) returns
true as well.
3) For any adversary B that returns a ballot box with
ballots that satisfy ValidInd, the experiment ExpconsisB,V,I(λ)
specified in Figure 5 returns true with a probability negli-
gible in the security parameter. In the game, the adversary
is allowed to register a set of identities of its chosing and
then, for honestly generated keys for the election (pk, sk)
come up with a board BB such that the result of the tally
r is different from the extracting the votes underlying the
ballots, applying the weeding policy of the election and then
applying the result function to the votes left.
ExpconsisB,V,I(λ)
1 : uL← empty
2 : (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ)
3 : ∀id ∈ I do uL.[id]← Register(id)
4 : BB← B(pk, uL)
5 : e← ∀b ∈ BB. ValidInd(b, pk)
6 : (r,Π)← Tally(BB, sk)
7 : for i in 1..|BB| do
8 : dbb[i]← Extract(BB[i], sk)
9 : r′ ← Count ◦ Policy(dbb)
10 : return (r 6= r′ ∧ e)
Figure 5. The Strong Consistency experiment
STRONG CORRECTNESS. Finally, strong correctness is the
guarantee that an honestly created ballot will not be rejected
by a ballot validation algorithm. The existing definition [13]
demands that this property holds even with respect to boards
that are created maliciously. While natural, this requirement
is too strong for systems where there is a registration
authority, and where validity of ballots depends on wether
their associated credentials having been used already. For
example, in the case of Belenios, an adversary could easily
win the game by returning a bulletin board which contains
some identity id with a credential that does not belong
to id and a ballot: any further vote by id with his own
credential is rejected. In this paper we propose an extension
of strong correctness which incorporates in the security
experiment the condition that the board that the adversary
returns satisfies some minimal well-formedness condition.
The formal definition uses the experiment in Figure 6. It
considers an adversary Belenios who after seeing the list of
credentials (honestly generated by the registration authority),
it choses a voter id, a vote v and outputs a bulletin board BB
(lines 1-4 from the experiment). The experiment will check
if an honestly created ballot by id for vote v will be accepted
as valid with respect to BB. The minimal condition that
BB needs to satisfy is that any ballot present on BB which
involves either id or its credentials must involve both. The
adversary wins if for such a board, the honest vote for id is
invalid.
ExpcorrB,V,I(λ)
1 : uL← empty
2 : (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ)
3 : ∀id ∈ I do uL.[id]← Register(id)
4 : (id, v,BB)← B(pk, uL)
5 : e← false
6 : if (id ∈ I) then
7 : (usk, upk)← uL.[id]
8 : e1 ← ∀x.∀y. (x, y, ?, ?) ∈ BB =⇒
9 : (x, y) = (id, upk) ∨ (x 6= id ∧ y 6= upk)
10 : b← Vote(id, v, pk, usk)
11 : e2 ← Valid(BB, b, pk)
12 : e← e1 ∧ ¬e2
13 : return e
Figure 6. The Strong Correctness experiment
Definition 3 (Strong Correctness). A voting scheme V is
strongly correct if the advantage of any efficient adversary
B, defined by AcorrB,V,I(λ) = Pr[ExpcorrB,V,I(λ) = 1] (where
ExpcorrB,V,I(λ) is defined in Figure 6) is negligible as a func-
tion of λ.
3.2. Verifiability
At the very least, a verifiable voting schemes should
allow voters to check that their vote contributed to the
outcome of the election. This is usually done in a individual
way: each user checks the presence of their ballot in the
ballot box. In addition, it should also be possible for voters
(or, better, for any third party) to check whether the pub-
lished result of the election corresponds to the votes cast by
voters (and recorded in the ballot box). Various definitions of
verifiability have been proposed [21]. We consider here the
notion of strong verifiability introduced in [20] for Helios-
C, a preliminary version of Belenios. It captures individual,
universal, and eligibility verifiability and accounts for the
fact that voters may not perform the verifiability checks. As
in [20], we consider two corruption scenarios:
1) a dishonest ballot box with an honest registrar;
2) a honest ballot box with a dishonest registrar.
In both cases we assume the tallying authorities may mis-
behave.
VERIFIABILITY AGAINST DISHONEST BALLOT BOX. The
security game corresponding to a dishonest ballot box and
an honest registrar is depicted in Figure 7. After an honest
registration phase, the adversary entirely controls the ballot
box and has access to two oracles:
• Ovote(id, v) to require that some honest voter id votes
for v. The fact that voter id voted is stored in Hvote.
• Ocorrupt(id) to corrupt voter id and retrieve her secret
credential. Previous votes from id are removed from
Hvote.
Then the adversary publishes the final ballot box and voters
may check whether their ballot has been included in the bal-
lot box (through oracle Ocheck(id)). If the test is successful,
the corresponding voter (and vote) is stored in Checked.
The game ExpdbbA,V,I(λ) guarantees that the election result
corresponds to:
• all the votes from the honest voters who checked
(set C);
• some of the votes from the honest voters who did not
check (the adversary may always remove such votes).
This corresponds to the set L ⊆ H;
• at most k other (valid) votes, where k is the number of
corrupted voters (set D). This last condition controls
ballot stuffing: any adversary may be able to choose as
many votes as the number of corrupted voters but not
more. In particular, he cannot add arbitrary votes to the
results.
Formally, a voting scheme V is verifiable against dis-
honest ballot box, if for any set I of voters and for any
efficient adversary A = (A1,A2) the probability
Pr
[
ExpdbbA,V,I() = 1
]
to win the experiment depicted in Figure 7 is negligible.
VERIFIABILITY AGAINST DISHONEST REGISTRAR. The se-
curity game corresponding to a honest ballot box and a
dishonest registrar is depicted in Figure 8. It is very similar
to the previous game except that the ballot box now behaves
honestly and the adversary choses the credentials of the
voters. Again, the result has to contain all the votes from
honest voters who checked, a subset of the votes of voters
who did not check and at most k arbitrary valid votes from
the k dishonest voters. A voting scheme V is verifiable
ExpdbbA,V,I(λ)
1 : BB,Hvote,Checked, coL← [ ]
2 : (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ)
3 : // for all voters we assign credentials, and publish the public credentials
4 : ∀id ∈ I do
5 : (usk, upk)← Register(id)
6 : uL[id]← (usk, upk)
7 : L← L ∪ {upk}
8 : // the adversary commits to a ballot box
9 : bb, state← AOcorrupt,Ovote1 (sk, L)
10 : // keep ballots that use exactly one of the assigned credentials
11 : BB← {(id, upk, c, s)|(id, upk, c, s) ∈ Policy bb ∧ upk ∈ L}
12 : (r, pi)← AOcheck2 (state)
13 : e1 ← Verify((pk,Publish BB, r), pi)
14 : // C contains votes from voters that checked, and H contains votes from honest voters that did not check
15 : C ← {v| (id, upk, v, c, s) ∈ Checked}
16 : H ← {v| (id, upk, v, c, s) ∈ (Hvote− Checked)}
17 : e2 ← ∃D. ∃L. L ⊆ H ∧ |D| ≤ |coL| ∧ r = Count
(
C ∪ L ∪D
)
18 : return e1 ∧ ¬e2
Oracle Ocheck(id)
1 : // Over the intended ballot, decided using the voting policy
2 : for (id, upk, v, c, s) ∈ Policy(Hvote) do
3 : // test its membership w.r.t the ballot box.
4 : if VerifyVote((id, upk, c, s),Publish BB) ∧ (id, ?, ?, ?, ?) /∈ Checked then
5 : Checked← Checked + (id, upk, v, c, s)
Oracle Ocorrupt(id)
1 : usk← ⊥
2 : // if it is a valid voter return the credential
3 : if (id ∈ I ∧ id /∈ coL) then
4 : coL← coL + [id]
5 : // remove all honest ballots created by that voter
6 : Hvote← {(id′, upk, v, c, s) ∈ Hvote| id′ 6= id}
7 : (usk, upk)← uL.[id]
8 : return usk
Oracle Ovote(id, v)
1 : (usk, upk)← uL.[id]
2 : b← ⊥
3 : if (id ∈ I ∧ id /∈ coL) then
4 : // create a ballot and store it in Hvote
5 : (id′, upk′, c′, s)← Vote(id, v, upk, pk, usk)
6 : Hvote← Hvote + [(id, upk′, v, c′, s)]
7 : b← (id, upk′, c′, s)
8 : return b
Figure 7. The verifiability experiment against a dishonest ballot box. In experiment ExpdbbA,V,I , the adversary A1 has access to the set of oracles O =
{Ocorrupt,Ovote}, and A2 has access to Ocheck.
against dishonest registration, if for any efficient adversary
A the probability
Pr
[
ExpdregA,V,I() = 1
]
to win the experiment depicted in Figure 8 is negligible.
DISCUSSION. Compared to the original definition of [20],
we made three main changes. First, we now provide the
secret key of the election to the adversary. Indeed, for
Belenios as well as many other voting schemes, verifiability
does not rely on the security of the key used to encrypt the
votes. Hence we propose a stronger definition that states
that verifiability is guaranteed even when the election key
is corrupted.
Second, we clarify the definition of the set Checked that
records which voters have checked, making sure that we
only consider the final ballot box. Indeed, in case a voter
re-votes (e.g. first for v1 and then v2), she should check that
her last cast ballot belongs to the ballot box (and not the
first one). What to do in case of revote was not specified
in [20]. In practice, it may be cumbersome for voters to
ExpdregA,V (λ)
1 : BB,Hvote, coL← [ ]
2 : (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ)
3 : // adversary gives the list of voters and their crdentials
4 : (uL, state)← A1(sk)
5 : I ← {id|uL.[id] 6= ⊥}
6 : // the voting process is held- ballots are added to the ballot box
7 : state← AOcorrupt,Ovote,Ocast,Oboard2 (state)
8 : // at the end of the election, a verification phase is run
9 : (r,Π)← AOcheck3 (state)
10 : e1 ← Verify((pk,Publish BB, r),Π)
11 : C ← {v| (id, upk, v, c, s) ∈ Checked}
12 : H ← {v| (id, upk, v, c, s) ∈ (Hvote− Checked)}
13 : e2 ← ∃D. ∃L. L ⊆ H ∧ |D| ≤ |coL| ∧ r = Count
(
C ∪ L ∪D
)
14 : return e1 ∧ e2
Oracle Ovote(id, v)
1 : (upk, usk)← uL.[id]
2 : b← ⊥
3 : if (id ∈ I ∧ id /∈ coL) then
4 : (id′, upk′, c′, s′)← Vote(id, v, pk, usk)
5 : Hvote← Hvote + [(id, upk′, v, c′, s′)]
6 : b← (id, upk′, c′, s′)
7 : if Valid(BB, uL, b, pk) then
8 : BB← BB + [b]
9 : return b
Oracle Ocast(id, upk, c, s)
1 : if (id ∈ I ∧ id ∈ coL ∧ Valid(BB, (id, upk, c, s), pk)) then
2 : BB← BB + [(id, upk, c, s)]
Oracle Oboard()
1 : return Publish BB
Figure 8. The verifiability experiment against a dishonest registration. In experiment ExpdregA,V , the adversary A2 has access to the set of oracles O =
{Ocorrupt,Ovote,Ocast, Oboard}, and adversary A3 has access to Ocheck. Ocheck and Ocorrupt are those shown in Figure 7
wait for the final box to make their check. This condition
may often be relaxed, assuming the presence of auditors that
ensure that the ballot box grows consistently (i.e. no ballots
are removed).
Finally, when the registrar is dishonest, even honestly
generated ballots may not be valid. For example, several
voters may receive the same credentials, or some voters
may receive invalid credentials. Therefore, we now reflect
that, although a voter may believe she has voted properly
(recorded in the set Hvote), her ballot should be included
in the ballot box only if it is valid.
4. Belenios
In this section, we present the Belenios voting system
and state our main results, i.e. machine-checked proofs of
privacy and verifiability for this protocol. We keep the de-
scription as close as possible to the current implementation
of the protocol while keeping it compatible with the syntax
of a single-pass voting system.
The core cryptographic primitive which enables privacy
preserving tallying in Belenios is a labelled public-key
encryption scheme constructed by composing El Gamal
encryption with a Chaum-Pedersen proof of knowledge. We
model this composition by considering an abstract homo-
morphic encryption scheme E ′ = (KGen′,Enc′,Dec′,Add′)
and an abstract proof system Σ′R′ = (P
′,V′) and
building a labelled encryption scheme LPKE(E ′,Σ′R′) =
(KGen′,Dec,Enc) as shown in Figure 10. Typically, the
proof system is used to prove that the vote v is valid, also
including the voter’s public credentials inside the statement
to link the creation of the non-malleable ciphertext with the
signature.
Belenios is also parameterized by a hash function Hash
used to display a fingerprint of the ballots (easier to check
for a voter).
The Belenios Voting Scheme. Belenios is constructed
around a labelled public-key encryption scheme. The formal
description of the algorithms that define the protocol is
in Figure 9. Here we provide an overview of how these
algorithms work.
Definition 4. Let E = LPKE(E ′,Σ′R′) be a labelled
public-key encryption scheme constructed as shown in Fig-
ure 10 from a homomorphic encryption scheme E ′, and
a proof system Σ′R′ . Consider a signature scheme Π =
(SKGen,Sig,Vf), a second proof system ΣR = (P,V)
whose relationR holds if the result corresponds to the ballot
box, and a hash function Hash over the public credential,
labelled ciphertext and signature. Given an abstract revote
policy Policy, we define the Belenios voting scheme
Belenios[Policy]
as the single-pass voting scheme defined by the algorithms
shown in Figure 9.
Less formally, the Belenios algorithms operate as fol-
lows:
Setup(1λ)
1 : (pk, sk)← KGen(1λ)
2 : return (pk, sk)
Register(id)
1 : (upk, usk)← SKGen(1λ)
2 : return (upk, usk)
Verify((pk, pbb, r), pi)
1 : return V((pk, pbb, r), pi)
Publish(FBB)
1 : pbb← {(b,Hash b) | b ∈ Policy FBB}
2 : return pbb
Vote(id, v, pk, usk)
1 : upk← get-upk usk
2 : (c, σ)← Enc(pk, upk, v)
3 : s← Sig((c, σ), usk)
4 : return (id, upk, (c, σ), s)
Valid(BB, b, pk)
1 : (id, upk, (c, σ), sig)← b
2 : e1 ← ∀x.∀y. (x, y, ?, ?) ∈ BB =⇒
3 : (x, y) = (id, upk)
4 : ∨ (x 6= id ∧ y 6= upk)
5 : e2 ← V′(c, σ, pk, upk)
6 : e3 ← Vf(upk, (c, σ), sig)
7 : return (e1 ∧ e2 ∧ e3)
VerifyVote(b, hbb)
1 : return Hash b ∈ hbb
Tally(FBB, sk)
1 : vbb = [ ]
2 : for b in Policy FBB do
3 : (upk, (c, σ), sig)← b
4 : e1 ← V′(c, σ, pk, upk)
5 : e2 ← Vf(upk, (c, σ), sig)
6 : if (e1 ∧ e2) then
7 : vbb← vbb ∪ {c}
8 : c← Add(vbb)
9 : r ← Dec(sk, c)
10 : pbb← Publish FBB
11 : pi ← P((pk, pbb, r), sk)
12 : return (r, pi)
Figure 9. Algorithms defining the Belenios Belenios[Policy] scheme. BB is stored internally, while FBB = {(upk, cip, sig)| (id, upk, cip, sig) ∈ BB}
is given to the talliers to compute the result of the election.
Enc(pk, v, upk)
1 : r ← Zq
2 : c← Enc′(pk, v; r)
3 : pi ← P′((c, pk, upk), (v, r))
4 : return (c, pi)
Dec(sk, upk, (c, pi))
1 : e← V′((c, pk, upk), pi)
2 : if e then
3 : return Dec′(sk, c)
4 : return ⊥
Figure 10. Constructing labelled public-key encryption scheme from ho-
momorphic encryption and PoK: LPKE(E ′,Σ′R′ ).
Setup(1λ): Generates a pair of keys (pk, sk) by calling
the encryption scheme E’s key generation algorithm
KGen(1λ).
Register(id): Creates a pair of signing keys (upk, usk) for
the voter id, using the signature scheme Π’s key gen-
eration algorithm SKGen. We assume that the public
credential upk can be efficiently recovered given the
secret credential usk.
Vote(id, v, pk, usk): Returns, for a voter id with credentials
(upk, usk), a ballot of the form (id, upk, (c, σ), s). The
ciphertext (c, σ) is the output of Enc(pk, v, upk), where
Enc is the encryption algorithm of the labelled public-
key encryption scheme E . The signature s is computed
over (c, σ) using the signature scheme Π, as the output
of Sig(usk, (c, σ)).
Valid(BB, (id, upk, (c, σ), s), pk): Evaluates the validity of
the ballot (id, upk, (c, σ), s). First, it checks that the
proof and the signature by calling V′(c, σ, pk) and
Vf(upk, (c, σ)). Then, it further checks that there does
not exist a ballot in BB that uses either: i) the same
identity id with a different credential upk′ 6= upk, or
ii) a different identity id′ 6= id with the same credential
upk.
Box(BB, b): Returns the ballot box BB ∪ {b} if
Valid(BB, b, pk) holds; and BB otherwise.
Publish(FBB): Publishes information about the content of
a stripped ballot box that does not contain voter iden-
tities. First, a core list of ballots are obtained in C
by applying a filtering policy based on the public
credential.
C = Policy(FBB)
Then, every ballot is extended by adding a hash over
it, and publishing the result
PBB = {(b,Hash(b)) | b ∈ C}.
Tally(FBB, sk): Returns the result and a proof that the tally
was computed correctly by calling the prover P. At
tallying time, the ballot box BB′ contains only stripped
ballots that do not contain identities, and have the form
(upk, (c, σ), s). First, all ballots that contain invalid
proofs or invalid signatures are removed. The revote
policy Policy is then used to filter the ballots. Finally,
the Add algorithm is applied to the ciphertexts in the
remaining ballots to homomorphically compute a single
ciphertext that gets decrypted to obtain the election’s
result.
Verify((pk, pbb, r),Π): Calls the verify algorithm of the
verifier V, to check that the tally corresponds to the
public bulletin board.
VerifyVote(b, pbb): Checks that the ballot b belongs to the
public bulletin board. This check is made lighter by
only verifying that the ballot’s hash appears on the
bulletin board, rather than the entire ballot.
Security assumptions. In the two following sections we
present our main results concerning the privacy and verifia-
bility of the Belenios voting scheme. For all these theorems,
we provide machine-checked proofs in EasyCrypt [6].
Throughout, and to avoid repetition, we assume the fol-
lowing of the primitives used in the construction of Belenios:
• the encryption scheme LPKE(E ′,Σ′R′) is IND-1-CCA
and well-spread;
• the proof system ΣR (used to prove correct tallying) is
zero-knowledge, a proof of knowledge and complete;
• the signature scheme Π is strongly existentially un-
forgeable, and
• Hash is a collision-resistant hash function.
In addition, we note that our proof is in the random ora-
cle model. In particular, the hash functions used in the zero-
knowledge proof systems are modelled as random oracles.
As discussed by Cortier et al. [18], the use of random oracles
which often simplifies pen-and-paper proofs considerably, it
leads to significant complexity for machine-checked proofs.
We do not insist on this aspect in this paper.
Security of Belenios. We can now formally state the secu-
rity properties of Belenios. We consider two common cases
for the revote policy Policy:
1) first. Only the first valid vallot cast by each voter is
kept and tallied. This corresponds to the case where
revotes are forbidden.
2) last. Only the last valid ballot cast by each voter is kept
and tallied. This option is the policy implemented by
Belenios.
Belenios is ballot private and verifiable for both policies.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions stated above the voting
scheme Belenios[Policy] (for Policy ∈ {first, last}) satisfies
• privacy – i.e. ballot privacy, strong correctness and
strong consistency;
• strong verifiability against a dishonest ballot box (with
honest registration);
• strong verifiability against a dishonest registration
(with honest ballot box).
Here we give an overview of the main ideas behind the
proof, with the EasyCrypt proof closely following standard
cryptographic practice.
PRIVACY. Strong correctness and strong consistency imme-
diately follow from the definition of Belenios.
For ballot privacy, we follow the same two-step proof
strategy as for the existing analysis of Helios [18]. First,
we replace the real zero-knowledge proof with a simulated
one. Then, we use the security of the encryption scheme
to change the view of the adversary on the ballot box with
one which maintains no information on the honest votes. It
is worth noting that since we consider a static corruption
model, some of the proof aspects are simpler than the
corresponding ones in [18].
STRONG VERIFIABILITY AGAINST DISHONEST BALLOT
BOX. To show that Belenios satisfies this property we need
to show that the adversary has to provide the correct result
and proof for the ballot box he is committed too. We
split this property in two distinct ones which we call tally
uniqueness and accuracy (See Appendix A for details). In
turn, we show that these two properties hold under the
completeness and the proof of knowledge property of the
proof system.
Part of the proof deals with ensuring the correctness of
the result. Specifically, we need to show that the votes of
honest voters are correctly tallied and that the total number
of dishonest votes in the ballot box does not exceed that of
the dishonest voters. Clearly, the first part of the statement
holds only for those voters who check that their vote is
present; under the collision resistance property of the hash
function Hash if the check succeeds, then the ballot which
they have cast is in the ballot box. To argue the upper
bound on the number of dishonest votes cast, we use the
unforgeability of the signature scheme: the only votes that
are in the ballot box need to correspond to a valid credential.
STRONG VERIFIABILITY AGAINST DISHONEST REGIS-
TRAR. To prove strong verifiability when the ballot box
is honest but the registrar may misbehave, we proceed
similarly in the case of honest voters (e.g. to show that their
votes are correctly recorded, whenever they check that this
is the csae). To bound the number of dishonest votes, we
rely on the honesty of the ballot box: the adversary may
only add valid votes by calling the Ovote oracle (which
only adds honest ballots) or by calling Ocast, which adds
a ballot in the name of a dishonest voter. Then the policy
(first or last) guarantees that at most one ballot per dishonest
voter is counted.
Extension to scheme variants. Our approach also covers
several interesting election-variants of Belenios, where the
talliers may have access to the entire ballot box (including
the link between voters and their cast ballot). Specifically,
we provide a proof for a generalized version of Belenios by
abstracting two of the algorithms which specify the details
of how the scheme operates. Specifically:
Publish-policy (PubPol, for short) The information made
available on the public bulletin board may vary.
1) identity. A liberal choice is to publish all the avail-
able information.
PubPol(L) = L.
2) policy-view. Another possibility is to reveal only the
relevant information, by publishing the exact ballots
used to compute the result.
PubPol(L) = Policy(L).
Anonymize (Anon, for short) Whether or not the identity of
the voter should be part of the public ballot depends
on the election rules. Anonymize selects if the identity
of the voter is made public or kept hidden.
1) false. Returns the entire ballot. The talliers (and the
voters by means of PubPol) have access to the link
between a voter and his cast ballot.
Anon((id, upk, cip, sig)) = (id, upk, cip, sig)
2) true. Returns the ballot without the voter identity.
The identities of the voters are kept secret, and the
talliers do not have access to information like who
voted.
Anon((id, upk, cip, sig)) = (upk, cip, sig)
Additionally, we now consider the hash function Hash,
used in defining Belenios (Figure 9), to take an additional
input: the voter identity or an empty element depending on
the instantiation of Anon. This is just a method of ensur-
ing the same input type for the hash function is provided
throughout our definitions and proofs.
Using the same syntax than for the definition of Belenios,
we introduce the voting scheme
Belenios′[PubPol,Anon,Policy]
• where Setup,Register,Vote,Verify,Valid have been
defined in Figure 9;
• the definition of Tally remains unchanged from Fig-
ure 9, with the exception that it takes input BB (in-
stead of FBB) and line 3 where the ballot is of form
(id, upk, (c, σ), sig);
• and Publish,VerifyVote are modified as described in
Figure 11. The algorithm Publish publishes the bal-
lots according to PubPol and Anon, the algorithm
VerifyVote is updated accordingly.
In particular,
Belenios[Policy] = Belenios′[policy-view, true,Policy].
Publish(BB)
1 : pbb← {(Anon(b),Hash(Anon(b)))|b ∈ PubPol(BB)}
2 : return pbb
VerifyVote(b, pbb) for PubPol = policy-view
1 : return Hash(Anon(b)) ∈ {h|(b, h) ∈ pbb}
VerifyVote(b, pbb) for PubPol = identity
1 : return Hash(Anon(b)) ∈ {h|(b, h) ∈ Policy(pbb)}
Figure 11. The algorithms Publish,VerifyVote of the voting scheme
Belenios′[PubPol,Anon,Policy].
Our proof extends to the generalised voting scheme
Belenios′[PubPol,Anon,Policy], under the same crypto-
graphic assumptions.
Theorem 2. Let V = Belenios′[PubPol,Anon,Policy]. Un-
der the assumptions stated above (earlier in this section)
V is private (ballot private, strongly correct and strongly
consist), strongly verifiabley against a dishonest ballot box
(with honest registration), and strongly verifiable against a
dishonest registration (with honest ballot box) if :
• PubPol ∈ {identity, policy-view};
• Anon ∈ {true, false};
• Policy ∈ {last, first},
5. Formal Proofs, our Results and their Impact
We now discuss our formally verified results touching
upon the effort involved and lessons learned. All the results
presented in this paper are backed by machine-checked
proofs in EasyCrypt. In Table 1, we detail the size,
similarity and development effort for each of the proof com-
ponents; we also give a rough indication of their complexity.
We break down the information in 4 categories: General
Concepts cover definitions for the underlying primitives and
assumptions; Privacy covers the definitions and proofs for
the three privacy-related properties for Belenios; Verifia-
bility covers the definitions and proofs for the verifiability
properties; and Variants covers the adaptation of the proofs
to election-variants of Belenios.
One first observation is how much of the existing Helios
privacy proof [18] we could reuse. It turns out that even
with the reasonably big changes to the security definitions
which we have adapted to the case of Belenios, we could
reuse much of the proof of privacy (about 75%). 2 The
main difficulties faced in extending the proof of privacy
to Helios are in fact related to the definitional challenges
including the registrar involved. Perhaps more interestingly,
the proof of verifiability against a dishonest ballot box and
the proof of verifiability against a dishonest registrar are very
similar despite the differences in the definitions of these two
properties and in the assumptions they rely on. Overall, the
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the formal development,
consisting of definitions and axioms, saw the addition of
1188 new (or modified) lines of code compared to the
previous TCB for Helios. This includes definitions related
to signature schemes (217 lines) and the security definitions
for verifiability (865 lines), but also the extensions to privacy
notions that let them capture the registration phase (106
lines).
Finally, we note that we intentionally made little effort to
make our approach more modular: the proofs for election-
variants of Belenios are obtained as modifications of the
Belenios code-base rather than instances of a more general
approach. Effort towards a more modular approach would
certainly be useful in identifying interesting properties that
underlie verifiability, in general. However, such an effort
would be premature. As we highlight in this paper, there is
still work to be done to stabilise definitions of verifiability,
as illustrated throughout the paper. For example, extending
definitions to voter registration and key distribution had
unexpected consequences even on the definition of ballot
privacy.
Table 1 also presents the estimated development effort
(in person-weeks) involved in each of the proof components,
with the Helios development [18] as a starting point.
BENEFITS OF MACHINE-CHECKED PROOFS. EasyCrypt [6]
is an interactive proof assistant with built-in support for
2. The low degree of similarity in General Concepts accounts mainly
for the addition of security properties for the signature, and a generic
reduction to multi-challenge unforgeability with corruption. Many of the
base definitions are in fact common.
TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS FOR THE BELENIOS PROOF
Belenios LoC Ver. Time(s)
Code Sim.
(%)
Dev. Effort
(PW)
General
Concepts 5936 348 55% Helios 4
Privacy 2700 238 75% Helios 2
Verifiability 14590 1523 - 20
Variants 47030 3965 95% Belenios 1
expressing cryptographic security definitions (game-based
and simulation-based) and formalising cryptographic proofs
in a language that is familiar to cryptographers. Security
definitions are modelled as probabilistic programs, parame-
terised by other probabilistic programs representing the ad-
versary and the oracles it is given access to. Security proofs
are then modelled as sequences of conditional equivalences
between these programs, in a way similar to that introduced
by Bellare and Rogaway [10].
Given an EasyCrypt proof (or other machine-checked
proof), a reader who trusts the automated proof checker
only has to read and understand the definitions and theorem
statements to be convinced of the results. The asymmetry
this introduces between the proof writer and the proof reader
is particularly appealing in a domain such as cryptography,
where reading a proof often requires a level of expertise
almost equal to that of the proof writer. Although machine-
checked proofs do not alleviate the need to understand the
formalised definitions, being able to only focus on under-
standing the definition and completely bypass the need to
understand the proofs may be a significant step towards
better acceptance and adoption. Other tools such as F? [7]
or FCF [30] have been used to formalise cryptographic
security proofs. Among them, EasyCrypt has demonstrated
its ability to both handle large and complex protocols, and at
the same time support cryptographic definitions that remain
close in style and spirit to their pen-and-paper specifications.
If the former is necessary for protocols and properties as
complex as those involved in electronic voting, the latter is
particularly valuable when trying to understand the effect of
small adjustments to security definitions on security notions
and trust assumptions.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS. From the
formalization experiment we report here, we highlight a few
lessons that we believe could be of use to future efforts–on
or away from electronic voting.
First, our experience highlights the value of abstraction,
despite its initial cost. In particular, plugging a formal
definition of Belenios into the formal definitions of privacy
developed by Cortier et al. [18] was instrumental in quickly
identifying that the definitions of privacy were inappropriate.
We did this expecting to simply work, as a trivial validation
of the privacy properties of Belenios. This ability to quickly
check a belief–rather than trusting that similarity implies
equivalence–is a great benefit of formal proofs, and is
mainly enabled by the development of abstract and general
definitions.
This same ability to quickly check believed results is
also what led to the early identification of the definitional
issues discussed in this paper. There is a great need for
clear security definitions for electronic voting, that can
serve as (perhaps parameterized) benchmarks for the critical
evaluation of competing solutions. However, these security
definitions must capture essential details of the voting sys-
tem that are usually left out of security analyses.
One final lesson, learned early on, is that working with
simulation based notions in the random oracles is not as easy
as traditionally assumed: one cannot simply add and remove
them as they please. There are real security concerns when
dealing with split random oracles, part of which can be taken
over by a simulator, while others remain independent. Fiore
and Nitulescu [27] take first steps towards a more thorough
analysis of these issues and solutions to them.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have refined existing formal definitions
for privacy and verifiability of electronic voting protocols
including a registrar, and have developed machine-checked
proofs that Belenios meets the resulting properties.
Our proof also extends to a few election variants of
Belenios beyond its current deployments, considering in
particular different revote policies, and different policies
regarding the data published on the public bulletin board.
These considerations may make Belenios deployable in
settings in which its current implementation choices are
unacceptable due to regulations or bylaws in place.
More importantly, our formalization identifies several
issues that are not captured by existing definitions of privacy
and verifiability – in particular when protocols employ reg-
istration authorities. Although we solve these issues for the
case of Belenios, future work is needed to better understand
these issues in general, and develop formal definitions for
these properties that apply more widely and can thus be
used as benchmarks to evaluate the security of voting so-
lutions in practice. In particular, the need for an additional
trust assumption – that the registrar is trusted – is slightly
unsatisfactory. Indeed, one would hope that, by splitting the
role normally fulfilled solely by the ballot box over two
different actors, the trust could be split equally. However,
Belenios only achieves the stronger notions of ballot privacy
when both ballot box and registrar are trusted. It would be
interesting to consider new protocols that would provide
ballot privacy as long as the ballot box and registrar do
not collude, as is the case for verifiability.
In addition, although we consider election variants that
may offer differing security guarantees in terms of coercion-
resistance or protections against other specialised attacks,
our proofs only consider the basic notions of privacy and
verifiability. Formalizing other (stronger) security notions
that can better serve to evaluate and compare the practical
security of various voting systems – including their election-
specific rules – is an interesting direction for further work.
We note that this study illustrates the feasibility of
developing machine-checked proofs to study the security of
deployed electronic voting systems, and encourages similar
developments for other schemes. We strongly believe that
machine-checked proofs, if they are not more readable than
pen-and-paper proofs–and even if they do increase the proof
writer’s burden, do make it easier for non-experts to gain
trust in complex cryptographic systems.
In the context of deploying real-world voting systems
in particular, such trust is crucial, and could be further
reinforced by leveraging machine-checked formal specifica-
tions to develop formally-verified independent tally verifiers
for specific elections. Doing so would require refining the
proofs to cover details of parsing and formatting, including
potential checks that must be performed when dealing with
concrete representations of cryptographic values.
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Appendix
To prove verifiability of Belenios, we introduce interme-
diary security definitions as in [20], namely tally uniqueness
and accuracy.
TALLY UNIQUENESS. Intuitively, this property ensures that
no two different results can be simultaneously accepted by
the verification algorithm in the context of the same election.
The adversary has to produce a ballot box, and election key
and two different results (r 6= r′) with two proofs. Formally,
we define the advantage of the adversary B for any voting
scheme V in the experiment ExptuniqB,V as :
Pr
[
ExptuniqB,V () = 1
]
.
ExptuniqB,V ()
1 : (BB, pk, r, pi, r′, pi′)← B
2 : ev1 ← Verify((pk,Publish(BB, pk), r), pi)
3 : ev2 ← Verify((pk,Publish(BB, pk), r′), pi′)
4 : return ev1 ∧ ev2 ∧ (r 6= r′)
This definition imposes a determinism over the output
of Tally, as the result has to be unique for a given ballot
box. In the case of mixnets, the counting function multiset
must preserve this determinism. A simple instantiation to
lexicographic order maintains this property.
ACCURACY. Intuitively, any voting protocol should ensure
that the result of an election (computed by calling the Tally
algorithm) can be successfully verified. Formally, a voting
scheme V is accurate if for any efficient adversary B and for
any set of voters I , the following probability is negligible
in λ:
Pr
[
ExpaccB,V,I(λ) = 0
]
.
ExpaccB,V,I(λ)
1 : pk, sk← Setup(1λ)
2 : ∀id ∈ I do uL[id]← Register(id)
3 : BB← B(sk, uL)
4 : (r, pi)← Tally(BB, sk)
5 : return Verify((pk,Publish BB, r), pi)
We prove (in EasyCrypt) that Belenios satisfies tally
uniqueness and accuracy.
Lemma 1. Let Policy be an abstract algorithm, then
Belenios (Policy) is tally unique and accurate.
Proof.
Tally uniqueness. To ensure that no two different results
can be verified successfully by the verifier of the ΣR proof
system, it is sufficient for ΣR to be a proof of knowledge for
a relation that implies the existence of a unique secret key
matching the given public key and such that the given result
corresponds to tallying the ballots obtained by decrypting
the given ballot box.
Accuracy. The probability of verifying the proof output
by Tally using the Verify algorithm is exactly that of veri-
fying a valid proof–the completeness of the proof system.
Note that the relation R checks if the result corresponds to
the decryption of the board.
